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       <title>IV.5 Systemic Risk - Asociación de Supervisores Bancarios de las Américas</title>
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           <title>Elements of Effective Macroprudential Policies</title>
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           <media:title type="plain">Elements of Effective Macroprudential Policies</media:title>
           <media:description type="html"><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Responding to an existing G20 mandate, this joint work reports on the experiences gained so far regarding elements and practices that can be useful for effective macroprudential policy making. The above since experience with macroprudential policy is growing: For instance, a large number of countries have put in place dedicated institutional arrangements, thus progress is being made with the design and implementation of macroprudential tools, as well as an increasing body of empirical research is available that is aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of those policies. </p>]]></media:description>
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           <description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Responding to an existing G20 mandate, this joint work reports on the experiences gained so far regarding elements and practices that can be useful for effective macroprudential policy making. The above since experience with macroprudential policy is growing: For instance, a large number of countries have put in place dedicated institutional arrangements, thus progress is being made with the design and implementation of macroprudential tools, as well as an increasing body of empirical research is available that is aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of those policies. </p>]]></description>
           <author> (Anonymous)</author>
           <category>IV.5 Systemic Risk</category>
           <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jan 2017 18:35:06 +0000</pubDate>
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           <title>Guidelines for Identifying and Dealing with Weak Banks</title>
           <link>https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/risk-management/systemic-risk/692-d330-3?format=html</link>
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           <media:title type="plain">Guidelines for Identifying and Dealing with Weak Banks</media:title>
           <media:description type="html"><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Weak banks are a worldwide phenomenon. They pose a continuing challenge for bank supervisors and resolution authorities in all countries, regardless of the political structure, financial system and level of economic and technical development. All bank supervisors have to be prepared to minimise the incidence of weak banks and deal with them when they occur.</p>]]></media:description>
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           <description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Weak banks are a worldwide phenomenon. They pose a continuing challenge for bank supervisors and resolution authorities in all countries, regardless of the political structure, financial system and level of economic and technical development. All bank supervisors have to be prepared to minimise the incidence of weak banks and deal with them when they occur.</p>]]></description>
           <author> (Anonymous)</author>
           <category>IV.5 Systemic Risk</category>
           <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2015 05:08:27 +0000</pubDate>
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              <item>
           <title>The G-SIB Assessment Methodology - Score Calculation</title>
           <link>https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/risk-management/systemic-risk/691-d296-3?format=html</link>
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           <media:title type="plain">The G-SIB Assessment Methodology - Score Calculation</media:title>
           <media:description type="html"><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Following the global financial crisis, there has been renewed scrutiny on the impact that the failure of large financial institutions could have on the broader financial system. The interconnected nature of today’s global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) has contributed to a system where the potential failure of a single large institution can have wider effects that reverberate throughout the global economy. This in turn has led to the Basel III reforms, spearheaded by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which aim to improve the resiliency of banks and banking systems. Over and above the higher requirements for all internationally active banks, the Committee’s G-SIB standards require additional going-concern loss absorbency for G-SIBs.</p>]]></media:description>
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           <description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Following the global financial crisis, there has been renewed scrutiny on the impact that the failure of large financial institutions could have on the broader financial system. The interconnected nature of today’s global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) has contributed to a system where the potential failure of a single large institution can have wider effects that reverberate throughout the global economy. This in turn has led to the Basel III reforms, spearheaded by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which aim to improve the resiliency of banks and banking systems. Over and above the higher requirements for all internationally active banks, the Committee’s G-SIB standards require additional going-concern loss absorbency for G-SIBs.</p>]]></description>
           <author> (Anonymous)</author>
           <category>IV.5 Systemic Risk</category>
           <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2014 23:03:49 +0000</pubDate>
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           <title>Supervisory Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures</title>
           <link>https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/risk-management/systemic-risk/688-bcbs283?format=html</link>
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           <media:title type="plain">Supervisory Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures</media:title>
           <media:description type="html"><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">One of the key lessons from the financial crisis was that banks did not always consistently measure, aggregate and control exposures to single counterparties or to groups of connected counterparties across their books and operations. Throughout history there have been instances of banks failing due to concentrated exposures to individual counterparties (eg Johnson Matthey Bankers in the United Kingdom in 1984, the Korean banking crisis in the late 1990s). Large exposures regulation has been developed as a tool for limiting the maximum loss a bank could face in the event of a sudden counterparty failure to a level that does not endanger the bank’s solvency.</p>]]></media:description>
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           <description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">One of the key lessons from the financial crisis was that banks did not always consistently measure, aggregate and control exposures to single counterparties or to groups of connected counterparties across their books and operations. Throughout history there have been instances of banks failing due to concentrated exposures to individual counterparties (eg Johnson Matthey Bankers in the United Kingdom in 1984, the Korean banking crisis in the late 1990s). Large exposures regulation has been developed as a tool for limiting the maximum loss a bank could face in the event of a sudden counterparty failure to a level that does not endanger the bank’s solvency.</p>]]></description>
           <author> (Anonymous)</author>
           <category>IV.5 Systemic Risk</category>
           <pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2014 10:34:03 +0000</pubDate>
       </item>
              <item>
           <title>Updated Methodology and the Higher Loss Absorbency Requirement</title>
           <link>https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/risk-management/systemic-risk/686-bcbs255?format=html</link>
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           <media:title type="plain">Updated Methodology and the Higher Loss Absorbency Requirement</media:title>
           <media:description type="html"><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">This document updates and replaces the November 2011 publication Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement. Below is a summary of the main changes relative to that publication. These changes reflect the lessons learnt from applying the assessment methodology using data submitted by banks in respect of their positions as at the financial year-ends 2009 to 2011. The changes also include the addition of the disclosures that banks are required to make to ensure that the assessment methodology operates on the basis of publicly available information.</p>]]></media:description>
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           <description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">This document updates and replaces the November 2011 publication Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement. Below is a summary of the main changes relative to that publication. These changes reflect the lessons learnt from applying the assessment methodology using data submitted by banks in respect of their positions as at the financial year-ends 2009 to 2011. The changes also include the addition of the disclosures that banks are required to make to ensure that the assessment methodology operates on the basis of publicly available information.</p>]]></description>
           <author> (Anonymous)</author>
           <category>IV.5 Systemic Risk</category>
           <pubDate>Sun, 30 Jun 2013 16:30:57 +0000</pubDate>
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              <item>
           <title>Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures</title>
           <link>https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/risk-management/systemic-risk/690-d101a?format=html</link>
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           <media:title type="plain">Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures</media:title>
           <media:description type="html"><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Financial market infrastructures (FMIs) that facilitate the clearing, settlement, and recording of monetary and other financial transactions can strengthen the markets they serve and play a critical role in fostering financial stability. However, if not properly managed, they can pose significant risks to the financial system and be a potential source of contagion, particularly in periods of market stress. Although FMIs performed well during the recent financial crisis, events highlighted important lessons for effective risk management. These lessons, along with the experience of implementing the existing international standards, led the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to review and update the standards for FMIs. </p>]]></media:description>
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           <description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Financial market infrastructures (FMIs) that facilitate the clearing, settlement, and recording of monetary and other financial transactions can strengthen the markets they serve and play a critical role in fostering financial stability. However, if not properly managed, they can pose significant risks to the financial system and be a potential source of contagion, particularly in periods of market stress. Although FMIs performed well during the recent financial crisis, events highlighted important lessons for effective risk management. These lessons, along with the experience of implementing the existing international standards, led the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to review and update the standards for FMIs. </p>]]></description>
           <author> (Anonymous)</author>
           <category>IV.5 Systemic Risk</category>
           <pubDate>Sat, 31 Mar 2012 23:02:02 +0000</pubDate>
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              <item>
           <title>Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems</title>
           <link>https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/risk-management/systemic-risk/689-d43?format=html</link>
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           <media:title type="plain">Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems</media:title>
           <media:description type="html"><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Safe and efficient payment systems are critical to the effective functioning of the financial system. Payment systems are the means by which funds are transferred among banks, and the most significant payment systems, which this report refers to as systemically important payment systems, are a major channel by chich shockscan be transmitted across domestic adn international financial systems and markets. </p>]]></media:description>
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           <description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Safe and efficient payment systems are critical to the effective functioning of the financial system. Payment systems are the means by which funds are transferred among banks, and the most significant payment systems, which this report refers to as systemically important payment systems, are a major channel by chich shockscan be transmitted across domestic adn international financial systems and markets. </p>]]></description>
           <author> (Anonymous)</author>
           <category>IV.5 Systemic Risk</category>
           <pubDate>Sun, 31 Dec 2000 13:54:18 +0000</pubDate>
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