https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions?format=html Mon, 02 Jan 2017 18:36:46 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/supervisory-approach/1412-elements-of-effective-macroprudential-policies-1?format=html Elements of Effective Macroprudential Policies Responding to an existing G20 mandate, this joint work reports on the experiences gained so far regarding elements and practices that can be useful for effective macroprudential policy making. The above since experience with macroprudential policy is growing: For instance, a large number of countries have put in place dedicated institutional arrangements, thus progress is being made with the design and implementation of macroprudential tools, as well as an increasing body of empirical research is available that is aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of those policies. 

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/supervisory-approach/1412-elements-of-effective-macroprudential-policies-1?format=html Responding to an existing G20 mandate, this joint work reports on the experiences gained so far regarding elements and practices that can be useful for effective macroprudential policy making. The above since experience with macroprudential policy is growing: For instance, a large number of countries have put in place dedicated institutional arrangements, thus progress is being made with the design and implementation of macroprudential tools, as well as an increasing body of empirical research is available that is aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of those policies. 

]]> (Anonymous) II.3 Supervisory Approach Mon, 02 Jan 2017 18:36:46 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/1410-elements-of-effective-macroprudential-policies-3?format=html Elements of Effective Macroprudential Policies Responding to an existing G20 mandate, this joint work reports on the experiences gained so far regarding elements and practices that can be useful for effective macroprudential policy making. The above since experience with macroprudential policy is growing: For instance, a large number of countries have put in place dedicated institutional arrangements, thus progress is being made with the design and implementation of macroprudential tools, as well as an increasing body of empirical research is available that is aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of those policies. 

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/1410-elements-of-effective-macroprudential-policies-3?format=html Responding to an existing G20 mandate, this joint work reports on the experiences gained so far regarding elements and practices that can be useful for effective macroprudential policy making. The above since experience with macroprudential policy is growing: For instance, a large number of countries have put in place dedicated institutional arrangements, thus progress is being made with the design and implementation of macroprudential tools, as well as an increasing body of empirical research is available that is aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of those policies. 

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Mon, 02 Jan 2017 18:31:14 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/consolidated-supervision-and-cooperation-conglomerates/1297-correspondent-banking-1?format=html Correspondent banking Through correspondent banking relationships, banks can access financial services in different jurisdictions and provide cross-border payment services to their customers, supporting international trade and financial inclusion.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/consolidated-supervision-and-cooperation-conglomerates/1297-correspondent-banking-1?format=html Through correspondent banking relationships, banks can access financial services in different jurisdictions and provide cross-border payment services to their customers, supporting international trade and financial inclusion.

]]> (Anonymous) II.1 Consolidated Supervision and Cooperation Conglomerates Mon, 18 Jul 2016 08:06:04 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/588-d330?format=html Guidelines for Identifying and Dealing with Weak Banks Weak banks are a worldwide phenomenon. Supervisors should be ready to deal with them. This report provides a toolkit offering practical guidelines in the areas of problem identification, corrective action, resolution techniques and exit strategies. The target audience of this report is the supervisory community, the resolution community and international financial institutions advising supervisors.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/588-d330?format=html Weak banks are a worldwide phenomenon. Supervisors should be ready to deal with them. This report provides a toolkit offering practical guidelines in the areas of problem identification, corrective action, resolution techniques and exit strategies. The target audience of this report is the supervisory community, the resolution community and international financial institutions advising supervisors.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Tue, 30 Jun 2015 23:24:31 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/587-d297?format=html Basel Capital Framework National Discretions The Basel capital framework contains a number of national discretions to allow the standards to be implemented differently by authorities in different jurisdictions. This can be useful when differences in the structure and development of financial systems warrant different approaches. In practice, however, the Committee recognises that the use of national discretions can also impair the comparability of implementation across jurisdictions, particularly if supervisors do not implement them with the same conservatism. This was highlighted by three recent studies on the variation of risk-weighted assets in the banking book and trading book.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/587-d297?format=html The Basel capital framework contains a number of national discretions to allow the standards to be implemented differently by authorities in different jurisdictions. This can be useful when differences in the structure and development of financial systems warrant different approaches. In practice, however, the Committee recognises that the use of national discretions can also impair the comparability of implementation across jurisdictions, particularly if supervisors do not implement them with the same conservatism. This was highlighted by three recent studies on the variation of risk-weighted assets in the banking book and trading book.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Sat, 01 Nov 2014 05:23:12 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/586-d296?format=html The G-SIB Assessment Methodology - Score Calculation Following the global financial crisis, there has been renewed scrutiny on the impact that the failure of large financial institutions could have on the broader financial system. The interconnected nature of today’s global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) has contributed to a system where the potential failure of a single large institution can have wider effects that reverberate throughout the global economy. This in turn has led to the Basel III reforms, spearheaded by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which aim to improve the resiliency of banks and banking systems. Over and above the higher requirements for all internationally active banks, the Committee’s G-SIB standards require additional going-concern loss absorbency for G-SIBs.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/586-d296?format=html Following the global financial crisis, there has been renewed scrutiny on the impact that the failure of large financial institutions could have on the broader financial system. The interconnected nature of today’s global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) has contributed to a system where the potential failure of a single large institution can have wider effects that reverberate throughout the global economy. This in turn has led to the Basel III reforms, spearheaded by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which aim to improve the resiliency of banks and banking systems. Over and above the higher requirements for all internationally active banks, the Committee’s G-SIB standards require additional going-concern loss absorbency for G-SIBs.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Fri, 31 Oct 2014 17:21:43 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/585-bcbs287-1?format=html Principles for Effective Supervisory Colleges A series of key initiatives have been undertaken with regard to the reform of international financial regulation and supervision. In particular, supervisors have taken steps to enhance the supervision of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Effective supervisory colleges play a key role in such enhanced supervision. Supervisory colleges can enhance information-sharing among supervisors, help the development of a common understanding of risk in financial groups, promote a shared agenda for addressing risks and vulnerabilities, and provide a platform for communicating key supervisory messages among college members.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/585-bcbs287-1?format=html A series of key initiatives have been undertaken with regard to the reform of international financial regulation and supervision. In particular, supervisors have taken steps to enhance the supervision of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Effective supervisory colleges play a key role in such enhanced supervision. Supervisory colleges can enhance information-sharing among supervisors, help the development of a common understanding of risk in financial groups, promote a shared agenda for addressing risks and vulnerabilities, and provide a platform for communicating key supervisory messages among college members.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Sun, 01 Jun 2014 05:20:01 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/consolidated-supervision-and-cooperation-conglomerates/571-bcbs287?format=html Principles for Effective Supervisory Colleges A series of key initiatives have been undertaken with regard to the reform of international financial regulation and supervision. In particular, supervisors have taken steps to enhance the supervision of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Effective supervisory colleges play a key role in such enhanced supervision. Supervisory colleges can enhance information-sharing among supervisors, help the development of a common understanding of risk in financial groups, promote a shared agenda for addressing risks and vulnerabilities, and provide a platform for communicating key supervisory messages among college members. 

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/consolidated-supervision-and-cooperation-conglomerates/571-bcbs287?format=html A series of key initiatives have been undertaken with regard to the reform of international financial regulation and supervision. In particular, supervisors have taken steps to enhance the supervision of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Effective supervisory colleges play a key role in such enhanced supervision. Supervisory colleges can enhance information-sharing among supervisors, help the development of a common understanding of risk in financial groups, promote a shared agenda for addressing risks and vulnerabilities, and provide a platform for communicating key supervisory messages among college members. 

]]> (Anonymous) II.1 Consolidated Supervision and Cooperation Conglomerates Sat, 31 May 2014 21:23:24 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/584-bcbs277?format=html Sound Practices of a Sound Capital Planning Process An important lesson from the financial crisis concerned the need for banking organisations (“banks”) to strengthen their capital planning processes. Some of the observed weaknesses reflected banks’ processes that were not sufficiently comprehensive, appropriately forward-looking or adequately formalised. As a result, some management teams underestimated the risks inherent in their banks’ business strategies and, in turn, misjudged capital needs.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/584-bcbs277?format=html An important lesson from the financial crisis concerned the need for banking organisations (“banks”) to strengthen their capital planning processes. Some of the observed weaknesses reflected banks’ processes that were not sufficiently comprehensive, appropriately forward-looking or adequately formalised. As a result, some management teams underestimated the risks inherent in their banks’ business strategies and, in turn, misjudged capital needs.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Tue, 31 Dec 2013 14:18:00 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/583-basel-iii-regulatory-consistency-assessment-programme-rcap?format=html Updated Methodology for Basel III Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program A key component of the Basel Committee’s work agenda is to ensure strong regulatory regimes and effective supervisory systems across its member jurisdictions. Public confidence in prudential ratios, resilient banks and a level regulatory playing field for internationally active banks cannot be assured without consistency in the adoption and implementation of the Basel standards. The lessons of the recent financial crisis have underscored the need for full, timely and consistent implementation of the standards.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/583-basel-iii-regulatory-consistency-assessment-programme-rcap?format=html A key component of the Basel Committee’s work agenda is to ensure strong regulatory regimes and effective supervisory systems across its member jurisdictions. Public confidence in prudential ratios, resilient banks and a level regulatory playing field for internationally active banks cannot be assured without consistency in the adoption and implementation of the Basel standards. The lessons of the recent financial crisis have underscored the need for full, timely and consistent implementation of the standards.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Tue, 01 Oct 2013 11:16:25 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/582-monitoring-tools-for-intraday-liquidity-management?format=html Monitoring Tools for Intraday Liquidity Management Management of intraday liquidity risk forms a key element of a bank’s overall liquidity risk management framework. In September 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)1 published its Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision (the Sound Principles), which provide guidance for banks on their management of liquidity risk and collateral.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/582-monitoring-tools-for-intraday-liquidity-management?format=html Management of intraday liquidity risk forms a key element of a bank’s overall liquidity risk management framework. In September 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)1 published its Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision (the Sound Principles), which provide guidance for banks on their management of liquidity risk and collateral.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Mon, 01 Apr 2013 11:14:29 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/581-principles-for-effective-risk-data-aggregation-and-risk-reporting-1?format=html Principles for Effective Risk Data Aggregation and Risk Reporting One of the most significant lessons learned from the global financial crisis that began in 2007 was that banks’ information technology (IT) and data architectures were inadequate to support the broad management of financial risks. Many banks lacked the ability to aggregate risk exposures and identify concentrations quickly and accurately at the bank group level, across business lines and between legal entities. Some banks were unable to manage their risks properly because of weak risk data aggregation capabilities and risk reporting practices. This had severe consequences to the banks themselves and to the stability of the financial system as a whole.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/581-principles-for-effective-risk-data-aggregation-and-risk-reporting-1?format=html One of the most significant lessons learned from the global financial crisis that began in 2007 was that banks’ information technology (IT) and data architectures were inadequate to support the broad management of financial risks. Many banks lacked the ability to aggregate risk exposures and identify concentrations quickly and accurately at the bank group level, across business lines and between legal entities. Some banks were unable to manage their risks properly because of weak risk data aggregation capabilities and risk reporting practices. This had severe consequences to the banks themselves and to the stability of the financial system as a whole.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Tue, 01 Jan 2013 11:12:59 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/580-basel-iii-the-liquidity-coverage-ratio-and-liquidity-risk-monitoring-tools-1?format=html Basel III The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools This document presents one of the Basel Committee’s key reforms to develop a more resilient banking sector: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The objective of the LCR is to promote the short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile of banks. It does this by ensuring that banks have an adequate stock of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can be converted easily and immediately in private markets into cash to meet their liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario. The LCR will improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy. This document sets out the LCR standard and timelines for its implementation.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/580-basel-iii-the-liquidity-coverage-ratio-and-liquidity-risk-monitoring-tools-1?format=html This document presents one of the Basel Committee’s key reforms to develop a more resilient banking sector: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The objective of the LCR is to promote the short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile of banks. It does this by ensuring that banks have an adequate stock of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can be converted easily and immediately in private markets into cash to meet their liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario. The LCR will improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy. This document sets out the LCR standard and timelines for its implementation.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Tue, 01 Jan 2013 11:11:13 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/575-the-proposed-revised-ratings-based-approach?format=html The Proposed Revised Ratings-Based Approach This technical paper describes the assumptions and methodology underlying the Revised Ratings-Based Approach (RRBA) as proposed in the Basel Committee’s recent consultative paper “Revisions to the Basel Securitisation Framework.”1 The RRBA is calibrated to approximate tranche capital charges generated by the Modified Supervisory Formula Approach (MSFA) under the assumption that an external credit rating is a proxy for the tranche’s expected loss rate (EL). Given an assumed risk profile for an underlying homogeneous pool of exposures (‘pool’) -- characterised by maturity, probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and asset value correlation (AVC) -- a stylised EL-based credit rating model consistent with the MSFA is used to infer attachment and detachment points for hypothetical tranches having various ratings, seniorities and, for non-senior tranches, thicknesses. With these variables as inputs, the MSFA is used to estimate implied tranche capital charges. The RRBA is then calibrated to approximate the relationship between MSFA capital charges and a tranche’s rating, seniority, maturity, and thickness.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/575-the-proposed-revised-ratings-based-approach?format=html This technical paper describes the assumptions and methodology underlying the Revised Ratings-Based Approach (RRBA) as proposed in the Basel Committee’s recent consultative paper “Revisions to the Basel Securitisation Framework.”1 The RRBA is calibrated to approximate tranche capital charges generated by the Modified Supervisory Formula Approach (MSFA) under the assumption that an external credit rating is a proxy for the tranche’s expected loss rate (EL). Given an assumed risk profile for an underlying homogeneous pool of exposures (‘pool’) -- characterised by maturity, probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and asset value correlation (AVC) -- a stylised EL-based credit rating model consistent with the MSFA is used to infer attachment and detachment points for hypothetical tranches having various ratings, seniorities and, for non-senior tranches, thicknesses. With these variables as inputs, the MSFA is used to estimate implied tranche capital charges. The RRBA is then calibrated to approximate the relationship between MSFA capital charges and a tranche’s rating, seniority, maturity, and thickness.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Tue, 01 Jan 2013 09:39:51 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/supervisory-approach/590-charter?format=html Charter on the Definition of the BCBS The BCBS is the primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. 

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/supervisory-approach/590-charter?format=html The BCBS is the primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. 

]]> (Anonymous) II.3 Supervisory Approach Mon, 31 Dec 2012 15:28:45 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/574-bcbs-wp22-3?format=html Foundations of the Proposed Modified Supervisory Formula Approach This technical paper describes the modelling framework underlying the Modified Supervisory Formula Approach (MSFA) as proposed in the Basel Committee’s recent consultative paper “Revisions to the Basel Securitisation Framework.” In contrast to the current Basel securitisation framework’s Supervisory Formula Approach (SFA), which assumes a one-year maturity for the underlying pool of securitised loans (‘pool’), the MSFA is based on an underlying Expected Shortfall, Mark-to-Market (MtM) framework for setting regulatory capital. This MtM underpinning, along with other key assumptions, is intended to render the MSFA more consistent with the Basel’s Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) framework for wholesale exposures. 

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/574-bcbs-wp22-3?format=html This technical paper describes the modelling framework underlying the Modified Supervisory Formula Approach (MSFA) as proposed in the Basel Committee’s recent consultative paper “Revisions to the Basel Securitisation Framework.” In contrast to the current Basel securitisation framework’s Supervisory Formula Approach (SFA), which assumes a one-year maturity for the underlying pool of securitised loans (‘pool’), the MSFA is based on an underlying Expected Shortfall, Mark-to-Market (MtM) framework for setting regulatory capital. This MtM underpinning, along with other key assumptions, is intended to render the MSFA more consistent with the Basel’s Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) framework for wholesale exposures. 

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Mon, 31 Dec 2012 05:29:45 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/consolidated-supervision-and-cooperation-conglomerates/570-bcbs233?format=html Framework for Dealing with DSIBs The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) issued the rules text on the assessment methodology for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and their additional loss absorbency requirements in November 2011. The G-SIB rules text was endorsed by the G20 Leaders at their November 2011 meeting. The G20 Leaders also asked the Committee and the Financial Stability Board to work on modalities to extend expeditiously the G-SIFI framework to domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs).

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/consolidated-supervision-and-cooperation-conglomerates/570-bcbs233?format=html The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) issued the rules text on the assessment methodology for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and their additional loss absorbency requirements in November 2011. The G-SIB rules text was endorsed by the G20 Leaders at their November 2011 meeting. The G20 Leaders also asked the Committee and the Financial Stability Board to work on modalities to extend expeditiously the G-SIFI framework to domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs).

]]> (Anonymous) II.1 Consolidated Supervision and Cooperation Conglomerates Sun, 30 Sep 2012 21:20:53 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/579-core-principles-for-effective-banking-supervision-2?format=html Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Core Principles) are the de facto minimum standard for sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks and banking systems. Originally issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee)1 in 1997, they are used by countries as a benchmark for assessing the quality of their supervisory systems and for identifying future work to achieve a baseline level of sound supervisory practices. The Core Principles are also used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP), to assess the effectiveness of countries’ banking supervisory systems and practices.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/techniques-and-other-supervisory-tools/579-core-principles-for-effective-banking-supervision-2?format=html The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Core Principles) are the de facto minimum standard for sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks and banking systems. Originally issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee)1 in 1997, they are used by countries as a benchmark for assessing the quality of their supervisory systems and for identifying future work to achieve a baseline level of sound supervisory practices. The Core Principles are also used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP), to assess the effectiveness of countries’ banking supervisory systems and practices.

]]> (Anonymous) II.2 Techniques and other Supervisory Tools Sat, 01 Sep 2012 11:09:24 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/consolidated-supervision-and-cooperation-conglomerates/572-joint29?format=html Principles for the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates The financial crisis that began in 2007 highlighted the significant role that financial groups, including financial conglomerates, play in the stability of global and local economies. Due to their economic reach and their mix of regulated and unregulated entities (such as special purpose entities and unregulated holding companies) across sectoral boundaries, financial conglomerates present challenges for sector specific supervisory oversight.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/consolidated-supervision-and-cooperation-conglomerates/572-joint29?format=html The financial crisis that began in 2007 highlighted the significant role that financial groups, including financial conglomerates, play in the stability of global and local economies. Due to their economic reach and their mix of regulated and unregulated entities (such as special purpose entities and unregulated holding companies) across sectoral boundaries, financial conglomerates present challenges for sector specific supervisory oversight.

]]> (Anonymous) II.1 Consolidated Supervision and Cooperation Conglomerates Sat, 01 Sep 2012 03:25:12 +0000 https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/supervisory-approach/591-bcbs230?format=html Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Core Principles) are the de facto minimum standard for sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks and banking systems. Originally issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) in 1997, they are used by countries as a benchmark for assessing the quality of their supervisory systems and for identifying future work to achieve a baseline level of sound supervisory practices. The Core Principles are also used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP), to assess the effectiveness of countries’ banking supervisory systems and practices.

]]> https://mail.asbaweb.net/en/bibl/supervisory-powers-and-functions/supervisory-approach/591-bcbs230?format=html The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Core Principles) are the de facto minimum standard for sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks and banking systems. Originally issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) in 1997, they are used by countries as a benchmark for assessing the quality of their supervisory systems and for identifying future work to achieve a baseline level of sound supervisory practices. The Core Principles are also used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP), to assess the effectiveness of countries’ banking supervisory systems and practices.

]]> (Anonymous) II.3 Supervisory Approach Fri, 31 Aug 2012 17:31:42 +0000