III. Aspectos de dirección y gestión prudencial - Asociación de Supervisores Bancarios de las Américas

Revisions to the Securitization Framework

(Anónimo) — Fri, 30 Dec 2016 16:11:56 +0000

Este marco para titularizaciones, que entrará en vigor en enero de 2018, forma parte de la agenda más amplia del Comité de Supervisión Bancaria de Basilea con relación a Basilea III y la propuesta de reformar estándares regulatorios para bancos, esto como respuesta a la crisis financiera global, lo que contribuye a un sector bancario más robusto. Este marco actualiza el marco previo en materia de titularizaciones publicado en diciembre de 2014, y va en consonancia con el tratamiento alternativo del capital para lograr titularizaciones más “simples, transparentes y comparables”, (términos también conocidos como STC).
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Measures to Reduce MisconductMeasures to Reduce Misconduct

(Anónimo) — Fri, 30 Dec 2016 09:20:59 +0000

En mayo de 2015, el Consejo de Estabilidad Financiera (FSB) acordó un plan sobre las medidas orientadas a reducir el riesgo de mala conducta (misconduct risk) y que cubre en esencia lo siguiente: (1) examinar si las reformas a los incentivos, por ejemplo, con relación a la gobernanza y a las estructuras de compensación, están teniendo el suficiente efecto para reducir malas conductas; (2) estudiar si se requieren pasos adicionales para mejorar los estándares globales en materia de conducta para los mercados de ingreso fijo, materias primas y monedas (conocidos como FICC) y; (3) coordinar las reformas para otras amenazas en este campo. De manera general, estos esfuerzos se orientan a fortalecer la resiliencia del sistema financiero por medio de la mejora en las expectativas, incluyendo una mayor toma de conciencia en torno a los estándares y sanas prácticas en materia de comportamiento por parte de los participantes en los mercados. Por tal motivo, este documento presenta una nueva visión de conducta ética, que cumple con el espíritu de las leyes y regulaciones correspondientes y que resulta crítica para fortalecer la lealtad del público y la confianza del mismo en el sistema financiero.
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Guiding Principles for the Replacement of IAS 39

(Anónimo) — Thu, 19 Nov 2015 21:45:57 +0000

The replacement of IAS 39 should improve the decision usefulness and relevance of financial reporting for stakeholders, including prudential regulators. Information is useful to users if it enables them to assess amounts, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows of the reporting entity and stewardship and accountability of the entity’s management.
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Creating a Culture of Risk Management

(Anónimo) — Wed, 18 Nov 2015 16:46:07 +0000

After the rash of corporate and accounting scandals leading up to the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, a “Culture of Compliance” emerged to foster ethical behavior and decision-making. The culture of compliance goes beyond having good policies and procedures, a dedicated compliance staff, sufficient compliance resources or electronic exception reports. It articulates a sense of responsibility for compliance at every level of the organization.
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Revised Template Capital Requirements to CCP Exposures Final

(Anónimo) — Wed, 18 Nov 2015 11:24:29 +0000

Template for the input of data for the calculation of capital requirements of banks' default fund exposures to CCPs under Method 1 of the interim rules.
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G30-New Paradigm Boards and Supervisors

(Anónimo) — Tue, 30 Jun 2015 08:10:56 +0000

In 2012, the Group of Thirty (G30) published Toward Effective Governance of Financial Institutions, which showed how weak and ineffective governance in systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) contributed to what the report called “the massive failure of financial sector decision making that led to the global financial crisis” (p. 5). In reaction to that report, the supervisory and Financial Stability Board community urged the G30 to provide additional insights into how interactions between boards and supervisors could be enhanced, and how the issue of strengthening and assessing risk culture could be tackled, particularly for SIFIs. This publication provides that information.
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Corporate governance principles for banks

(Anónimo) — Mon, 29 Jun 2015 20:50:06 +0000

Effective corporate governance is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole. Banks perform a crucial role in the economy by intermediating funds from savers and depositors to activities that support enterprise and help drive economic growth. Banks’ safety and soundness are key to financial stability, and the manner in which they conduct their business, therefore, is central to economic health. Governance weaknesses at banks that play a significant role in the financial system can result in the transmission of problems across the banking sector and the economy as a whole.
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Corporate governance principles for banks

(Anónimo) — Mon, 29 Jun 2015 14:47:03 +0000

The primary objective of corporate governance should be safeguarding stakeholders’ interest in conformity with public interest on a sustainable basis. Among stakeholders, particularly with respect to retail banks, shareholders’ interest would be secondary to depositors' interest. Effective corporate governance is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole.
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The Rewards of an Ethical Culture

(Anónimo) — Mon, 19 Jan 2015 10:17:28 +0000

Let me begin by thanking Sir William Blair and the Bank of England for inviting me to participate in this Project and at this Conference1. At the New York Fed, we have made ethical culture a priority for financial services. We have done this not as a formal part of a supervisory program, but more as a call for reform. In the short time that I have this afternoon, I will speak about the reasons why I believe reform is necessary, highlight some of the important practical features of a strong ethical culture, and conclude by setting out a few of the rewards that might result from it.
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Basel Capital Framework National Discretions

(Anónimo) — Thu, 30 Oct 2014 14:20:35 +0000

The Basel capital framework contains a number of national discretions to allow the standards to be implemented differently by authorities in different jurisdictions. This can be useful when differences in the structure and development of financial systems warrant different approaches. In practice, however, the Committee recognises that the use of national discretions can also impair the comparability of implementation across jurisdictions, particularly if supervisors do not implement them with the same conservatism. This was highlighted by three recent studies on the variation of risk-weighted assets in the banking book and trading book.
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Good Compliance, Not Mere Compliance

(Anónimo) — Sun, 19 Oct 2014 08:02:43 +0000

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, ongoing increases in capital buffers, reductions in funding vulnerabilities, improvements in risk management, and attention to orderly resolution are producing a substantially more resilient financial system. Yet even as the financial position of firms has been strengthened, headlines describing misconduct in financial firms have appeared with disturbing regularity. For a time, these stories were the legacy of pre-crisis errors and misdeeds, with a focus on the mortgages and mortgage-related products that lay at the heart of the crisis. But soon they were accompanied by allegations of post-crisis actions: rigging of LIBOR (London interbank offered rate) and foreign exchange rates, facilitation of tax evasion, inadequate controls on money laundering, and front running through dark pools, among others.
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Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture

(Anónimo) — Sun, 06 Apr 2014 14:08:00 +0000

Increasing the intensity and effectiveness of supervision is a key component of the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) efforts to reduce the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions (the SIFI Framework), along with requiring added capital loss absorbency and facilitating the orderly resolution of financial institutions. The FSB issued its first recommendations for enhanced supervision of financial institutions, in particular SIFIs, in October 2010, which underscored the key preconditions for effective supervision, including the need for (i) strong and unambiguous mandates; (ii) independence to act; (iii) sufficient quality and quantity of resources; and (iv) supervisors having a full suite of powers to execute on their mandate. Subsequent recommendations in 2011 and 2012 strengthened the supervisory expectations for financial institutions’ risk governance, internal controls and risk management functions, as well as risk data aggregation and risk reporting capabilities.
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Capital Requirements for Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties

(Anónimo) — Sun, 30 Mar 2014 20:15:17 +0000

This document presents the Basel Committee’s revised policy framework for the capital treatment of bank exposures to central counterparties (CCPs). Revisions to the framework were made to reflect decisions reached by the Committee after evaluating the results of the joint quantitative impact study (JQIS) and the feedback received from respondents to a related consultative document published in June 2013. The Committee wishes to thank institutions that participated in the JQIS as well as respondents to the consultative document.
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Guidance on External Audits of Banks

(Anónimo) — Sat, 01 Mar 2014 11:58:11 +0000

The recent financial crisis not only revealed weaknesses in risk management, control and governance processes at banks, but also highlighted the need to improve the quality of external audits of banks. External auditors of banks can play an important role in contributing to financial stability when they deliver quality bank audits which foster market confidence in banks’ financial statements. Quality bank audits are also a valuable input in the supervisory process. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee, or BCBS) is issuing this document on external audits of banks to improve external audit quality of banks and enhance the effectiveness of prudential supervision, which contribute to financial stability. This document replaces the documents The relationship between banking supervisors and banks’ external auditors (January 2002)1 and External audit quality and banking supervision (December 2008).

Sound Practices of a Sound Capital Planning Process

(Anónimo) — Mon, 30 Dec 2013 14:13:53 +0000

An important lesson from the financial crisis concerned the need for banking organisations (“banks”) to strengthen their capital planning processes. Some of the observed weaknesses reflected banks’ processes that were not sufficiently comprehensive, appropriately forward-looking or adequately formalised. As a result, some management teams underestimated the risks inherent in their banks’ business strategies and, in turn, misjudged capital needs.
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Capital Requirements for Banks Equity Investments in Funds

(Anónimo) — Fri, 29 Nov 2013 14:06:48 +0000

This document presents the Basel Committee’s final policy framework for calculating the capital requirements for banks’ equity investments in funds that are held in their banking book, including text for the final standard. This follows the consultative document published in July 2013.1 The Committee wishes to thank respondents for their comments in this regard.
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Modelling integrity through culture

(Anónimo) — Mon, 18 Nov 2013 10:00:39 +0000

Speech by Martin Wheatley, Chief Executive of the FCA, at the FCA Markets Conference 2013. This is the text of the speech as drafted, which may differ from the delivered version.
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Principles for An Effective Risk Appetite Framework

(Anónimo) — Sun, 17 Nov 2013 03:06:01 +0000

Increasing the intensity and effectiveness of supervision is a key component of the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) framework, endorsed by G20 Leaders, to reduce the moral hazard of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). As such, supervisory expectations for risk management particularly at SIFIs are increasing. The October 2011 FSB progress report on enhanced supervision noted that effective risk appetite frameworks (RAFs) that are actionable and measurable by both financial institutions and supervisors have not yet been widely adopted. It concluded that the development of an effective RAF is important for financial institutions and supervisors, and needs attention by both. The report recommended that supervisors discuss expectations for what a “good” risk appetite framework entails and how to supervise against these expectations.
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BANKING CONDUCT and CULTURE: A Call for Sustained and Comprehensive Reform

(Anónimo) — Mon, 30 Sep 2013 14:15:37 +0000

Banks and banking rely on trust. And while trust takes years to establish, it can be lost in a moment through failures caused by problematic ethics, values, and behaviors. Events that precipitated the global financial crisis and the subsequent issues that have emerged have revealed a multitude of cultural failures. This report recognizes that problematic cultural norms, and subcultures within large banks, have caused widespread reputational damage and loss of public trust. These events have been economically costly to firms in terms of fines, litigation, and regulatory action.

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The importance of culture in driving behaviours of firms and how the FCA will assess this

(Anónimo) — Wed, 17 Jul 2013 01:38:29 +0000

Speech by Clive Adamson, Director of Supervision, the FCA, at the CFA Society - UK Professionalism Conference, London. This is the text of the speech as drafted, which may differ from the delivered version.(Texto en inglés)