VI. Divulgación y transparencia - Asociación de Supervisores Bancarios de las Américas

FAQs on the Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements

(Anónimo) — Fri, 23 Dec 2016 15:01:10 +0000

El Comité de Supervisión Bancaria de Basilea ha recibido diversas preguntas relacionadas con la interpretación de algunos términos incluidos en documentación previa respecto de los Requerimientos de Revelación del Pilar III Revisado. Para contribuir en asegurar una implementación global que sea consistente con sus estándares, el Comité acordó revisar las preguntas que son más frecuentes y darles respuesta de manera conjunta con alguna elaboración técnica, o incluso alguna guía interpretativa en caso de ser necesario. Las preguntas más frecuentes para el los Requerimientos de Revelación del Pilar III Revisado y su correspondiente respuesta, se encuentran agrupadas en este documento bajo las siguientes categorías: 1. Visión general del manejo de riesgos y activos ponderados por riesgo; 2. Relación entre estados financieros y exposiciones regulatorias; 3. Riesgo de Crédito; 4. Riesgo de crédito de la contraparte; 5. Titularizaciones, y; 6. Riesgo de mercado.
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Public Quantitative Disclosure Standards for Central Counterparts

(Anónimo) — Sun, 01 Feb 2015 08:04:27 +0000

The CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures (PFMI)1 states that financial market infrastructures (FMIs) should provide relevant information to participants, relevant authorities and the broader public. Quantitative data are important components of the set of public disclosures that is expected of FMIs as part of satisfying the PFMI. This document sets out the public quantitative disclosure standards that central counterparties (CCPs) are expected to meet. These standards complement the Disclosure framework published by CPSS and IOSCO in December 2012.

Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements

(Anónimo) — Thu, 01 Jan 2015 01:10:35 +0000

Market discipline has long been recognised as a key objective of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereafter the “Committee” or “BCBS”). The provision of meaningful information about common key risk metrics to market participants is a fundamental tenet of a sound banking system. It reduces information asymmetry and helps promote comparability of banks’ risk profiles within and across jurisdictions. Pillar 3 of the Basel framework aims to promote market discipline through regulatory disclosure requirements. These requirements enable market participants to access key information relating to a bank’s regulatory capital and risk exposures in order to increase transparency and confidence about a bank’s exposure to risk and the overall adequacy of its regulatory capital.

Liquidity Coverage Ratio Disclosure Standards

(Anónimo) — Wed, 01 Jan 2014 07:59:44 +0000

The fundamental role of banks in financial intermediation makes them inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, of both an institution-specific and a market nature. Financial market developments have increased the complexity of liquidity risk and its management. During the early “liquidity phase” of the financial crisis that began in 2007, many banks – despite meeting existing capital requirements then in effect – experienced difficulties because they did not manage their liquidity in a prudent manner. The difficulties experienced by some banks, which, in some cases, created significant contagion effects to the broader financial system, were due to lapses in basic principles of liquidity risk measurement and management.

Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements

(Anónimo) — Wed, 01 Jan 2014 00:57:03 +0000

An underlying cause of the global financial crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage while apparently maintaining strong risk-based capital ratios. At the height of the crisis, financial markets forced the banking sector to reduce its leverage in a manner that amplified downward pressures on asset prices. This deleveraging process exacerbated the feedback loop between losses, falling bank capital and shrinking credit availability.

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Principles for Effective Risk Data Aggregation and Risk Reporting

(Anónimo) — Tue, 01 Jan 2013 00:52:24 +0000

One of the most significant lessons learned from the global financial crisis that began in 2007 was that banks’ information technology (IT) and data architectures were inadequate to support the broad management of financial risks. Many banks lacked the ability to aggregate risk exposures and identify concentrations quickly and accurately at the bank group level, across business lines and between legal entities. Some banks were unable to manage their risks properly because of weak risk data aggregation capabilities and risk reporting practices. This had severe consequences to the banks themselves and to the stability of the financial system as a whole.

Composition of Capital Disclosure Requirements

(Anónimo) — Fri, 01 Jun 2012 01:49:18 +0000

During the financial crisis, many market participants and supervisors attempted to undertake detailed assessments of the capital positions of banks and comparisons of their capital positions on a cross jurisdictional basis. The level of detail of the disclosure and the lack of consistency in the way that it was reported typically made this task difficult and often made it impossible to do with any accuracy. It is often suggested that lack of clarity on the quality of capital contributed to uncertainty during the financial crisis. Furthermore, the interventions carried out by the authorities may have been more effective if capital positions of the banks were more transparent.

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Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements for Remuneration

(Anónimo) — Thu, 30 Jun 2011 13:45:33 +0000

In July 2009, as part of its Enhancements to the Basel II framework, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced supplemental Pillar 2 guidance to address a number of risk management weaknesses revealed during the financial crisis that began in 2007. In this context, the Committee notably incorporated within Pillar 2 the Financial Stability Board’s Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, which were issued in April 2009 to improve compensation practices and strengthen supervision in this area. Paragrapah 94 of the supplemental Pillar 2 guidance included the principle that “Firms must disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their compensation practices to facilitate constructive engagement by all stakeholders, including in particular shareholders”.

Basel III Intl Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards & Monitoring

(Anónimo) — Tue, 30 Nov 2010 03:42:26 +0000

This document presents the liquidity portion of the Basel Committee’s reforms to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector. The objective of the reforms is to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy. This document sets out the rules text and timelines to implement the liquidity portion of the Basel III framework.